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This fascinating edited volume focuses on the nature and authority of precedent and forms of reasoning that it involves in common law and civil law systems. It addresses fundamental principles as to how and when to act following precedent and reasons for which it may be best to depart from precedent.

Stare decisis. --- Precedents (Law) --- Judgments --- Judicial process --- Law --- Legal certainty --- Res judicata --- Interpretation and construction

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Précédents (droit) --- Revirement de jurisprudence --- Processus judiciaire --- Droit --- Droits de l'homme --- Interprétation

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Law --- -Stare decisis --- -Precedents (Law) --- Judgments --- Judicial process --- Legal certainty --- Res judicata --- Acts, Legislative --- Enactments, Legislative --- Laws (Statutes) --- Legislative acts --- Legislative enactments --- Jurisprudence --- Legislation --- Interpretation and construction --- -Acts, Legislative --- Precedents (Law) --- -Interpretation and construction

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Stare decisis --- International law --- Customary law, International --- Droit international --- Droit coutumier international --- Sources --- Précédents (droit) --- Droit international. --- Précédents (droit)

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Neil Duxbury examines how precedents constrain legal decision-makers and how legal decision-makers relax and avoid those constraints. There is no single principle or theory which explains the authority of precedent but rather a number of arguments which raise rebuttable presumptions in favour of precedent-following. This book examines the force and the limitations of these arguments and shows that although the principal requirement of the doctrine of precedent is that courts respect earlier judicial decisions on materially identical facts, the doctrine also requires courts to depart from such decisions when following them would perpetuate legal error or injustice. Not only do judicial precedents not 'bind' judges in the classical-positivist sense, but, were they to do so, they would be ill suited to common-law decision-making. Combining historical inquiry and philosophical analysis, this book will assist anyone seeking to understand how precedent operates as a common-law doctrine.

Legal theory and methods. Philosophy of law --- Stare decision --- Law --- Interpretation and construction --- Judicial process --- Judicial process. --- Stare decisis --- Stare decisis. --- General and Others --- Law - Interpretation and construction --- Decision making, Judicial --- Judicial behavior --- Judicial decision making --- Judges --- Procedure (Law) --- Precedents (Law) --- Judgments --- Legal certainty --- Res judicata --- Psychological aspects --- Droit --- Common law --- Précédents (droit) --- Case law --- Sources